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Abstract
In the time since the merger of quantum mechanics and game theory was proposed
formally in 1999, the two distinct perspectives apparent in this merger of applying
quantum mechanics to game theory, referred to henceforth as the theory of “quantized
games”, and of applying game theory to quantum mechanics, referred to henceforth
as “gaming the quantum”, have become synonymous under the single ill-defined term
“quantum game”. Here, these two perspectives are delineated and a game-theoretically
proper description of what makes a multiplayer, non-cooperative game quantum me-
chanical, is given. Within the context of this description, finding Nash equilibrium in
a strictly competitive quantum game is exhibited to be equivalent to finding a solution
to a simultaneous distance minimization problem in the state space of quantum ob-
jects, thus setting up a framework for a game theory inspired study of “equilibrium”
behavior of quantum physical systems such as those utilized in quantum information
processing and computation.
1 Introduction
The modern mathematical approach of Shannon [1] describes information in terms of oc-
currence of events. The notion of informational content of an event is defined as a quantity
that is inversely proportional to the probability with which the event occurs, so that smaller
the probability of occurrence of an event the more informational content in the event, and
vice versa. The fundamental quantifier of information is therefore a probability distribu-
tion, which in the case of a collection of finitely many events is a sequence of real numbers
adding up to one, with each number in the sequence representing the probability with which
a particular event in the collection occurs.
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Quantum information studies the behavior of information under a quantum mechanical
model. As such, the notion of probability distribution is replaced with the notion of quan-
tum superposition followed by measurement. Quantum information and “classical” infor-
mation are fundamentally different, with perhaps the most dramatic difference exhibited by
the fact that certain quantum superpositions of two independent quantum objects produce,
upon measurement, probability distributions that are impossible to produce by independent
classical objects. For example, no flip of two independent classical coins will ever produce
the probability distribution
(
1
2 , 0, 0,
1
2
)
over the four possible states of the two coins; how-
ever, certain “flips” of two independent quantum coins (or qubits) can give rise to quantum
superpositions of the quantum coins called entangled states which, upon measurement, pro-
duce the probability distribution above. With its different than usual behavior together with
the possibility that such behavior could make contributions to scientific and technological
advancement, quantum information continues to be an active area of research. Relatively
recent papers such as [2, 3, 4] are good resources for initiating a study of quantum infor-
mation and its potential benefits to the fields of algorithms, cryptography, computation, and
artificial intelligence.
Quantum games form a relatively new and exciting area of research within quantum
information theory. In the theory of quantum games, one typically identifies features of
quantum information with those of multiplayer, non-cooperative games and looks for dif-
ferent than usual game-theoretic behavior such as enhanced Nash equilibria. Indeed, it has
been established [5, 6, 7] that when features of quantum information are introduced in mul-
tiplayer non-cooperative games such as Prisoners’ Dilemma and other simple two player,
two strategy games, Nash equilibrium outcomes can sometimes be observed that are better
paying than those available originally. Recent surveys of quantum games can be found in
[8, 9, 10]. In the case of single player games that are modeled by Markovian dynamics,
quantum analogues have been constructed that offer insights into the quantization of certain
Markov processes and quantum algorithms [11, 12]. Recent developments in representing
quantum games using octonions [13] and geometric algebras [14, 15] have also provided
insights into the behavior of quantum games.
As noted above, the prevailing research trend in the theory of quantum games involves
quantizing games, that is, introducing features of quantum information theory to games and
seeking insightful game-theoretic results such as Nash equilibria that are better paying than
those available originally. An opposite approach where one would introduce features of
game theory to quantum information does not appear as a prominent research trend in the
current quantum game theory literature. Picking up on this deficiency in the literature, we
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propose here that this latter approach, which we refer to as gaming the quantum, can poten-
tially produce insightful quantum information theoretic results. To this end, sections 2 and 3
together provide a mathematically formal review of non-cooperative games, the fundamen-
tal solution concept of Nash equilibrium in such games, and the notion of randomization
via probability distributions in these games that gives rise to the so-called mixed game.
Skipping section 4 for the moment, readers will find in section 5 a formal treatment of the
notion of a quantized non-cooperative game that builds up on the formalism developed in
sections 2 and 3, and shows how quantized games are the result of replacing randomization
via probability distributions with the higher order randomization via quantum superposition
followed by measurement. To delineate the notions of quantizing a game and gaming the
quantum, we first refer back to section 4 where the notion of a stochastic game is intro-
duced by suppressing reference to the game that underlies the mixed game of section 3.
This delineation is completed in section 6 where reference to the game underlying a quan-
tized game is suppressed and game-theoretic ideas are applied directly to the state space
of quantum superpositions. This gives rise to the notion of a quantum game that is more
general than a quantized game. Further, section 6 introduces, for the first time as far as
we can tell, a notion of players’ preferences over quantum superpositions which is used to
construct a novel geometric characterization of Nash equilibrium in quantum games. These
ideas are brought together in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 which connect the study of Nash
equilibria in quantum games to a simultaneous minimization problem in the Hilbert space
of quantum superpositions. Finally, section 6.1 proposes an novel synthesis of quantum
games and quantum logic circuits by way of an application of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
to the problem of designing mechanisms for quantum games at Nash equilibrium.
2 Non-cooperative Games
Multiplayer, non-cooperative game theory can be described as the science of making op-
timal choices under given constraints. To this end, introduce a set O of outcomes, a finite
number, say n, of individuals called players with non-identical preferences over these out-
comes, and assume that the players interact with each other within the context of these out-
comes. Call this interaction between players a game and define it to be a function G with
range equal to the setO and domain equal to the Cartesian product S1×S2×· · ·×Sn with Si
defined to the set of ith players pure strategies. Call an element of the set S1×S2×· · ·×Sn
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a play of the game or a strategy profile. In symbols, a game G is a function
G : S1 × S2 × · · · × Sn → O.
Note that a game is distinguished from an ordinary function by the notion of non-identical
preferences, one per player, defined over the elements of its range or the outcomes. Also
note that it is assumed that players make strategic choices independently, a fact stressed
by the fact that a game’s domain is the Cartesian product of the pure strategy sets of the
players.
Given a game G as above, assume further that the each player has full knowledge of his
and his opponents’ preferences over the outcomes, of pure strategies available to him and
to his opponents, and that each player is aware that he and his opponents are all rational
in that they all engage in a play of the game that is consistent with their respective prefer-
ences over the outcomes. In an ideal scenario, players will seek out a play that produces an
optimal (also known as Pareto-optimal) outcome o, that is, an outcome that cannot be im-
proved upon without hurting the prospects of at least one player. However, players typically
succeed in seeking out a play that satisfies the constraint of their non-identical preferences
over the outcomes. Such an outcome has the property that in the corresponding strategy
profile (or the play of the game) each player’s strategy is a best reply to all others, that is,
any unilateral change of strategy in such a play of the game by any one player will produce
an outcome of equal or less preference than before for that player. Such a play of a game
is called a Nash equilibrium [16]. A Nash equilibrium that happens to correspond to an
optimal outcome is called Pareto-optimal or simply an optimal Nash equilibrium.
Consider as an example the two player, two strategy non-cooperative game G with the
set of outcomes O = {o1, o2, o3, o4} and preferences of the players, labeled Player I and
Player II, given by
Player I : o2  o1  o4  o3 (2.1)
Player II : o3  o1  o4  o2 (2.2)
with the symbol standing as short-hand for “more preferred than”. The set of pure strate-
gies of each player is the two element set {D,H} and the game is defined as
G(D,D) = o1, G(D,H) = o3, G(H,D) = o2, G(H,H) = o4
Note from the players’ preferences that the outcome o1, corresponding to the play (D,D),
is optimal. However, the outcome o4 is the unique Nash equilibrium in this game, corre-
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Figure 1: Tabular form of the game G.
sponding to the strategy profile (H,H), because it satisfies the constraint of the players’
non-identical preferences over the outcomes in expressions (2.1) and (2.2) in that unilat-
eral deviation from this play of the game by either player results in an outcome that is less
preferable. This can be seen more clearly from the tabular format of the game G in Figure
1 which shows that the player who unilaterally deviates from the strategy profile (H,H) is
left with with an outcome that he prefers less than the outcome o4.
2.1 Non-existent or Sub-optimal Nash Equilibria and Game Extensions
In the game G above, note that while an optimal outcome exists, it is not the one that
manifests as the Nash equilibrium. This situation is considered to be an undesirable solution
to the game. Worse game-theoretic situations can occur. For instance, the Matching Pennies
game of Figure 2, where each player prefers 1 over −1 in any play of this game, entertains
no optimal outcomes nor any Nash equilibrium! A fundamental problem in game theory is
that of finding ways around such undesirable situations. One way this can be achieved is by
simple changing the game. For instance, one can talk of changing the players’ preferences in
the game G or even changing the function G itself. However, changing a game can naturally
be viewed as a form of cheating. Indeed, a humorous lament betrays this assessment of
changing a game as follows: “When I finally figured out answers to all of life’s questions,
they changed all the questions!” On a more practical note, one could argue that changing a
game can be costly. For example, the cost of changing a game may be social, such as the
one that Ghandi and the inhabitants of the Indian sub-continent incurred in their changing
of the British Raj game.
Is there a way then to overcome undesirable game-theoretic situations where Nash equi-
libria are non-existent or sub-optimal, without changing the game? An affirmative answer
can be found in the form of randomization via probability distributions. Randomization via
probability distribution is a time-honored method of avoiding undesirable game-theoretic
situations that has been practiced by players since time immemorial in the form of tossing
coins, rolling die, or drawing straws, but was formally introduced to game-theory by von
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Figure 2: Matching Pennies, a game with no Nash equilibrium.
Neumann [17].
3 Mixing the game
Randomization via probability distributions is introduced in a game formally as an exercise
in the extension of the game. Bleiler provides an excellent treatment of this perspective in
[18]. Taking the game G as an example, we extend its range to include probability distri-
butions over the outcomes by identifying these outcomes with the corners of the simplex of
probability distributions over four things, or the 3-simplex ∆3. Now probability distribu-
tions over the outcomes of G can be formed while at the same time any one of these original
outcomes can be recovered by putting full probabilistic weight on that outcome. Formally,
the set O = {o1, o2, o3, o4} is embedded in the set
∆3 =
{
(p1, p2, p3, p4) : 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1,
4∑
i=1
pi = 1
}
via the identification of each outcome oi with some corner of ∆3 so that pi is the proba-
bilistic weight on oi.
Next, a notion of non-identical preferences of the players over probability distributions
is defined. A typical way to define such preferences in game theory is via the notion of
expectation, constructed by assigning a numeric value, one per player, to each of the out-
comes such that the assignment respects the preferences of the players over the outcomes.
For a given probability distribution, expectation is defined to be
E(p1, p2, p3, p4) = p1a1 + p2a2 + p3a3 + p4a4 ∈ R (3.1)
with ai being the numeric value of the outcome oi. A player will now prefer one probability
distribution P over another Q if E(P ) > E(Q). The mixed game M is defined next with
domain equal to the Cartesian product of the sets of probability distributions over the pure
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strategies of the players. In symbols,
M : ∆1 ×∆1 → ∆3
where ∆1 is the set of probability distributions over the pure strategies of each player and
is referred to as the set of mixed strategies of the players. The mixed game M is defined as
M : ((p, 1− p), (q, 1− q)) 7→ (pq, (1− p)q, p(1− q), (1− p)(1− q))
Figure 4 gives a pictorial representation of the construction of a mixed game for the game
G. Note that the original game G can be recovered from the mixed game M by restricting
the domain of M to {D,H} × {D,H}. Therefore, even though the mixed game is an
entirely different game, the fact that the original game “sits inside” it and can be recovered
if so desired, game theorists argue that the mixed game is a way around undesirable game-
theoretic situations such as sub-optimal Nash equilibria, without changing the game.
The existence of Nash equilibria in the mixed game was addressed by John Nash [16]
who showed that a mixed game with a finite number of players is guaranteed to entertain at
least one Nash equilibrium. This powerful result offers a way around the most undesirable
situation possible in multi-player non-cooperative game theory, namely, a game without any
any Nash equilibria. Moreover, it is sometimes the case that Nash equilibrium in the mixed
game are near or fully optimal relative to the original game.
4 Gaming the Mixture
What can be said about the remains of the mathematical construction employed to produce
the mixed game M when the underlying game G and its domain are removed from consid-
eration? In this case, the function that remains, call it M ′, maps directly from ∆1 × ∆1
into ∆3 and is no longer an extension of G. The corners of each ∆1 no longer correspond
to pure strategies of the players in the game G and G is no longer recoverable from M ′ via
appropriate restrictions. However, because the range of the game G, together with players
preferences defined over its outcomes, is still intact within ∆3, a notion of players’ pref-
erences over elements of ∆3 as constructed in section 3 still holds. The new function M ′
can therefore be considered to be a multi-player non-cooperative game in which the set of
outcomes is ∆3 with players’ preferences over these outcomes (probability distributions)
defined in terms of players’ preferences over the corners of ∆3 via expectation, and the
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Figure 3: Construction of the mixed game M .
“pure strategy” sets of each player equal ∆1:
M ′ : ∆1 ×∆1 → ∆3.
In other words, M ′ is the result of “gaming the mixture” or an application of ideas from
multi-player non-cooperative game theory discussed in section 2 to the stochastic function
M ′. Contrast this with the construction of the mixed game M which can be described as
an application of stochastic functions to multi-player non-cooperative game theory. The
function M ′ can appropriately be called a stochastic game. Note that players’ preferences
over probability distributions need not be left over artifacts of players’ preferences over the
outcomes of the now non-existent underlying game G. Players’ preferences over probability
distributions can always be defined from scratch.
This idea of casting a given function in a game-theoretic setting by starting with a
game extension and then removing the underlying game from consideration is extended to
functions used in quantum mechanics in section 6. To this end, a relevant discussion on
extensions of games to include quantum mechanics appears in section 5 below.
5 Quantizing the Game
Note that because the function M does not map onto ∆3, the image of the mixed game
may not contain probability distributions that are optimal or near-optimal with respect to
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Figure 4: Construction of a quantized game Θ. The quantized game here is in fact the
family of quantizations prescribed by Eisert et al.
players’ preferences over probability distributions. As such, the mixed game might not
entertain Nash equilibria that are better those available originally. This is indeed the case
with the game G of section 2. In such persistent unsatisfactory game-theoretic situations,
game-theorists seek other extensions of the original game. Of special relevance here is
the extension of a game, formally suggested by Meyer [19], to included higher order ran-
domization via quantum superpositions followed by measurement. To this end, the out-
comes of a game are identified with an orthogonal basis of the space of quantum superposi-
tions. Mathematically, the space of quantum superpositions is a projective complex Hilbert
space. For the game G, a four dimensional projective Hilbert spaceH4 is required with the
four outcomes {o1, o2, o3, o4} identified with an orthogonal basis B = {b1, b2, b3, b4} of
H4. Now quantum superpositions of the outcomes of G can be formed. Formally, the set
O = {o1, o2, o3, o4} is embedded in the set
H4 =
{
c1b1 + c2b2 + c3b3 + c4b4 = (c1, c2, c3, c4) :
4∑
i=1
|ci|2 = 1
}
via the identification of of each oi with an element of the orthogonal basisB so that ci is the
projective complex-valued weight on oi and |ci|2 is the square of the norm of the complex
number ci. Measurement, denoted here as meas, of a quantum superposition q produces
a probability distribution in ∆3 from which the expectation of the outcomes of G to the
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players can be computed and the optimality of a quantum superposition can be defined.
Note that anyone of the outcomes of the game G can be recovered by putting full quantum
superpositional weight on the basis element corresponding to that outcome and making a
measurement. A quantized game Θ is defined next, typically as a unitary function from the
Cartesian product of sets of quantum superpositions of the players’ pure strategies intoH4,
with the added property that it reduces to the original game G under appropriate restrictions.
In symbols,
Θ : H2 ×H2 → H4
whereH2 denotes the set of quantum superpositions of the strategies of the players, referred
to in the literature as quantum strategies of the players. However, because a quantized game
is meant to be an extension of the original game G in a fashion analogous to the mixed game
of section 3, we propose that it is more appropriate to refer to H2 as the set of a player’s
quantized strategies. We also point out that the term quantized game in fact refers to an
entire family of games, in stark contrast to the term mixed game which refers to a specific
function. Depending on the exact nature of Θ, when followed by measurement, the image
of this composite map meas ◦ Θ can be larger than the image of mixed game and may
contain optimal or near-optimal probability distributions.
Quantization of games with two players, each having two pure strategies, have been
studied extensively with a recent survey of this subject appearing in [9]. One quantization
that underpins most studies of two player, two strategy games is the one proposed by Eisert,
Wilkens, and Lewenstein (EWL) [5]. It can be shown that the EWL quantization is the
specific family of functions explicitly defined as
Θ : ((α1, α2) , (β1, β2))→ (c1, c2, c3, c4)
where
c1 = (α1β1 + α2β2) + (α¯1β¯1 + α¯2β¯2)
c2 = −η(−α1β¯2 + α2β¯1) + η¯(−α¯2β1 + α¯1β2)
c3 = η¯(−α1β¯2 + α2β¯1)− η(−α¯2β1 + α¯1β2)
c4 = −i(α1β1 + α2β2) + i(α¯2β¯2 + α¯1β¯1)
η = e
ipi
4 =
1√
2
(1 + i),
and focuses on a particular variation of the game G with specific numeric values replacing
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the outcomes oi. This is the popular game known as Prisoner’s Dilemma. The authors of
EWL show that a Nash equilibrium with an expectation equal to the optimal outcome in the
original game of Prisoners’ Dilemma manifests in the quantized game when the play of the
quantized game is restricted to a certain sub-class of quantized strategies. However, when
plays of the quantized game consisting of the most general class of quantized strategies are
considered, no Nash equilibria manifest! This situation is remarkably different from that
of the mixed game where Nash’s theorem guarantees the existence of at least one Nash
equilibrium. This property of EWL quantization is presented in a more general setting of
two player, two strategy games by Landsburg in [20] where quaternionic coordinates are
utilized to produce the result.
6 Gaming the Quantum
Just as removing the underlying game G and its domain from consideration in the construc-
tion of the mixed game M in section 3 leaves the function M ′ that can be viewed as an
example of applying multi-player non-cooperative game theory to stochastic functions, re-
moving the game G from consideration in the construction of a quantized game Θ leaves
behind a function Θ′ that can be viewed as an example of an application of multi-player,
non-cooperative game theory to quantum mechanics or “gaming the quantum”. Viewing
the function Θ′ as quantum physical function because it maps into the joint state space
of quantum mechanical objects, it truly deserves to be called a quantum game. In other
words, a quantum game is any function mapping into a projective complex Hilbert space
provided a notion of preferences, one per player, is defined over quantum superpositions.
The factors in the domain of a quantum game can now be correctly referred to as the set of
quantum strategies of the players. In a more general setting, the set of quantum strategies
can conceivably be any set and need not be restricted toH2.
While it is certainly valid to utilize post-measurement expectation from quantum super-
positions to define players’ preferences over quantum superposition, doing so neglects the
mathematical structure of the projective complex Hilbert space of quantum superpositions
which is richer than that of the simplex of probability distributions. More precisely, the
space of quantum superposition entertains a natural notion of distance in terms of its inner-
product which can used to define players’ preferences via an orthogonal basis of the space
of quantum superpositions. Consider H4 with the orthogonal basis B = {b1, b2, b3, b4}
from section 5 above as an example and define the players’ preferences over the elements
11
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Figure 5: Distance between a quantum superposition Q and elements bi of an orthogonal
basis ofH4.
of B as
Player I : b2  b3 ≡ b1 ≡ b4 (6.1)
Player II : b3  b2 ≡ b1 ≡ b4 (6.2)
where the symbol “≡” represents a player’s indifference between the two basis elements
surrounding the symbol. The choice of preferences in equations (6.1) and (6.2) is moti-
vated by the setting of Grover’s quantum search algorithm where exactly one element of
some database, after identification with an orthogonal basis of some quantum system, is
sought out or most preferred and all other elements are less preferable. Preferences like
these correspond to the proverbial “one man’s meat is another man’s poison” situation and
give rise to strictly competitive games where what is best for one player is the worst for
the other(s). From this point of view, quantum search algorithms like Grover’s algorithm
are strictly competitive quantum games. For strictly competitive games, Nash equilibrium
takes on a more restricted nature in the form of a min-max solution where one player at-
tempts to minimizes his maximum possible loss in response to the other player’s attempts
to maximize his minimum possible gain.
Returning to the discussion on the mathematical structure of the Hilbert spaces, let x1,
x2 ∈ H4. The distance between these two elements is given by the angle
dist(x1, x2) = θ(x1,x2) = cos
−1 (| 〈x1, x2〉 |)
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where 〈x1, x2〉 is the inner-product of x1 and x2, | 〈x1, x2〉 | represents its length or norm,
and θ ∈ [0, pi2 ]. Player I will now prefer one quantum superposition q over another p if q is
closer to b2 than p is, that is
Player I : q  p⇔ dist(q, b2) < dist(p, b2).
Similarly, Player II will prefer one quantum superposition s over another r if s is closer to
b3 than r is:
Player II : s  r ⇔ dist(s, b3) < dist(r, b3).
The notion of Nash equilibrium can now be characterized as a play of a quantum game Θ′
that satisfies the constraints of the players’ preferences via this distance notion. Let Q be a
quantum superposition corresponding to a play (x∗, y∗) of the quantum game Θ′, that is
Θ′(x∗, y∗) = Q. (6.3)
The quantum superposition Q will be a Nash equilibrium outcome if unilateral deviation
on part of any one player from the corresponding play (x∗, y∗) will produce a quantum
superposition of lesser preference for that player than Q. Therefore, if Player I deviates
from his quantum strategy x∗ and instead employs the quantum strategy x, then
Θ′(x, y∗) = Qx with dist(Qx, b2) ≥ dist(Q, b2). (6.4)
Also, if Player II deviates from his quantum strategy y∗ and instead employs the quantum
strategy y, then
Θ′(x∗, y) = Qy with dist(Qy, b3) ≥ dist(Q, b3). (6.5)
The characterization of Nash equilibrium captured by equations (6.4) and (6.5) corresponds
to a simultaneous distance minimization problem in the Hilbert space H4, giving the fol-
lowing result:
Theorem 1: A necessary condition for a play (x∗, y∗) of a two player, strictly competitive
quantum game Θ′ to be a Nash equilibrium is that it minimize the distance between its im-
age Q inH4 under Θ′ and the most preferred basis element of each player inH4.
The theory of Hilbert space [21] shows that for a given sub-Hilbert space S of a Hilbert
13
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Figure 6: CSD quantum circuit for an arbitrary quantum logic gate U . The wires carry
qubits and the one qubit gates X , Y , M , N , V , and W are all controlled either by qubit
value |0〉, represented here by the symbol ◦, or qubit value |1〉, represented here by the
symbol •.
space H, there always exists a unique element s ∈ S that minimizes the distance between
elements of S and any fixed h ∈ H. This gives:
Corollary 1: A sufficient condition for the existence of Nash equilibrium in a strictly com-
petitive quantum game Θ′ is for the image of Θ′ to form a sub-Hilbert space of theH4.
6.1 Designing Quantum games at Nash Equilibrium
Physical implementation of a strictly competitive quantum game at Nash equilibrium is a
problem of mechanism design. A mechanism design approach to quantum games has been
proposed in [22]. Here, we propose a mechanism design approach for studying strictly
competitive quantum games at Nash equilibrium based on techniques from quantum logic
synthesis. Only the outline of this proposal is discussed below, with a more detailed analysis
of this approach deferred to a subsequent publication.
Continuing with the example developed in the preceding section, start with the orthog-
onal basis B ofH4 and preferences of Player I and Player II over the elements ofB defined
as in (6.1) and (6.2). Design next a quantum mechanism Θ′ and sets of quantum strategies
XI, XII for Player I and Player II respectively, so that as per Corollary 1 and Theorem 1,
the image of Θ′ is a sub-Hilbert space of H4 and there exist x∗ ∈ XI, y∗ ∈ XII such that
Θ′(x∗, y∗) = Q simultaneously minimizes dist(Q, b2) and dist(Q, b3).
Restricting to the case where the quantum game Θ′ is a unitary function mapping into
H4 and XI = XII = H2, the task of designing a quantum game Θ′ at Nash equilibrium
equals that of identifying a 4 × 4 unitary matrix U and quantum superpositions in each
H2 such that the conditions in both Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are satisfied. Note the as-
sumption here that the players will make independent quantum strategic choices, sometimes
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referred to as players’ “local” actions, although a quantum mechanism where this condition
is relaxed is conceivable [23]. Because the image of any linear function mapping into a
finite dimensional Hilbert space is a sub-Hilbert space, and because every unitary function
is linear (by definition), the sufficiency condition for a Nash equilibrium of Corollary 1 is
satisfied. The problem lies in identifying conditions under which U will satisfy the neces-
sary condition of Theorem 1. A solution to this problem based on quantum logic synthesis
is both elegant and appeals to the ultimately physical nature of the problem.
Viewing U as a quantum logic gate, the mechanism design problem for a quantum
game at Nash equilibrium resolves to synthesizing or constructing a circuit for U in terms
of universal quantum logic gates, that is, quantum logic gates which form a circuit that
can approximate U up to arbitrary accuracy. It is known that sets of quantum logic gates
that map quantum superpositions in H2 (single qubit) and H4 (two qubits) are universal
[24]. Moreover, both single and two qubit gates can be implemented practically using
most technologies currently available for performing quantum mechanical operations. One
technique for quantum logic synthesis, known as the cosine-sine decomposition (CSD), is
inspired by the corresponding unitary matrix decomposition technique [25]. The CSD ex-
presses a quantum logic gate as a circuit composed of multiply controlled single qubit gates
[26, 27, 28, 29], making the circuit implementable in a practical sense. The CSD quantum
logic circuit of an arbitrary 4 × 4 unitary matrix U , call it C, appears in Figure 6 where
the wires carry qubits and the one qubit gates X , Y , M , N , V , and W are all controlled
either by qubit value |0〉, represented by the symbol ◦, or qubit value |1〉, represented by
the symbol •. The quantum circuit C can be used to study the existence of specific quantum
games or possibly families of quantum games at Nash equilibrium as per Theorem 1.
We point out that C is a more general construction than the quantum circuit used in
the EWL [5] quantization of two player, two strategy games, appearing here in Figure 7,
because it can approximate any quantum logic gate (and circuit) to arbitrary accuracy. As
such, it is possible that at a functional level, the EWL quantum circuit can be implemented
via some particular instantiation of the quantum circuit C. But to the best of our knowledge,
this possibility has not been explored and remains an open question requiring further study.
Also note that the EWL quantum circuit is specifically designed so as to recover the under-
lying classical game such as Prisoners’ Dilemma. No such conditions are assumed here for
the quantum circuit C.
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Figure 7: Quantum circuit for EWL quantization of two player, two strategy games like
Prisoners’ Dilemma. The one qubit quantum logic gates labeled I and II are the players’
local actions on their respective qubits. The two qubit gate E entangles the qubits on which
the players local actions take place.
7 Conclusion
We envision several potential future directions in the area of quantum games. For one,
players’ preferences given in section 5 are strictly competitive in nature and are motivated
by a quantum computational and algorithmic context where exactly one outcome, corre-
sponding to a particular calculation or searched item, is the “correct” and therefore the
most desired outcome of a player. All others are less preferable. On the other hand, another
player (or even players) most prefers at least one of the latter. The equilibrium behavior of
quantum circuits can potentially be studied from this game-theoretic perspective. Indeed,
other preferences that are not strictly competitive in nature may be possible over quantum
superpositions, and an entire separate project can be devoted to the study preferences that
produce insightful results for quantum games that are not strictly competitive games.
Further generalization is another possible future direction. One would start with the
study of the class of functions intoH4, or indeed intoHn for any n > N , that would satisfy
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria. Generalizing
further would allow a game-theoretic study of a broader class of functions, culminating
with the positive operator valued measurement mapping into infinite dimensional vector
spaces with a continuum of basis elements. Note that these generalizations beyond the
Hilbert spaceH4 to more interesting mathematical spaces and objects are still grounded in
the physics of the quantum, and hence one can still accurately refer to these generalizations
as attempts at gaming the quantum. Such studies can potentially produce insightful results
in the engineering of control of quantum systems those corresponding to quantum circuits
and algorithms.
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